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Approved For Release 2003/05/28 : CIA-RDP78-04718A002300120030-2

57-0378

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CRC, 3/18/2003 1 February 1957

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MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

PARTICIPANTS: Senators Russell, Byrd and Saltonstall, and
Messrs. Allen Dulles and Paul

1. The Director had requested a meeting with Senator Russell for the purpose of discussing certain Agency problems and of establishing a modus operandi with the Senate Armed Services Committee during the present Session of the Congress. Just prior to the meeting, Senator Russell called to ask whether the Director would object to having Senators Byrd and Saltonstall present, and the Director said that he would be very pleased to meet with them.

2. Senator Russell started the meeting by asking the Director whether CIA was on top of the Middle East situation when it erupted in October. The Director stated that we were, and went through the chronology of events leading up to the Israeli-Anglo-French military movements, pointing out that intelligence reporting had been good during this period. Senator Byrd indicated that the President himself had given an opposite impression when he stated that he did not have any advance warning on the Egyptian invasion. The Director explained that he had discussed this matter with the President, and had established that the President intended his statement to mean that he had not been informed by [redacted] and did not refer to intelligence reports which had been made available to him. There was some further discussion of the Middle East situation. The Senators were particularly interested in the Syrian problem.

3. The Joint Committee problem was raised by the Director. He explained recent actions by the House Rules Committee, and informed the Senators of Mr. Vinson's concern about the situation. Senator Russell stated that he did not know what Senator Mansfield's exact intentions were, but that Mansfield had told him last Fall that he did not plan to press his resolution this Session unless it was previously passed by the House.

4. The Director raised the problem of the building and described the likely shortfall in funds. This led to a lengthy discussion of the personnel strength of the Agency, but when the discussion returned to the

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funding of the building. Senator Daltonstall remarked that he understood that the Smithsonian Institute was also some \$12 million short of the required funds for construction, and that he imagined that a number of other government buildings face the same problem. He seemed to feel that this matter should be taken up by the Congress in the context of all new funding requirements for construction. None of the Senators volunteered any special opinion as to whether CIA should or should not seek additional funds during this Session.

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5. CIA personnel strength in Headquarters was the principal topic of discussion. When informed by the Director that we had initially hoped to be able to plan for a building that would house [redacted] Senator Byrd began a series of questions as to why we needed that many people in Washington. The Director gave a number of examples of Agency activities which required large numbers of personnel, and in the process described a number of Agency activities which the public at large had no conception that we were involved in. Senator Byrd referred at times to a European trip which he and General Mudge had made in 1955. He seemed to question whether or not we were getting our money's worth out of certain operations, such as [redacted] etc. He emphasized, however, that he wasn't really concerned with the number of people we had overseas. He still didn't understand how we could justify anything like [redacted] in Washington. The Director indicated that he hoped to have an opportunity to explain to the Senators in detail just what all of our Washington people were doing, and that he would ask for such an opportunity in the near future. The Senators seemed to think this was a good idea. Senator Daltonstall indicated that he was unclear himself as to why we needed this number of people. Senator Russell evidently isn't clear on the matter either, although he did state at the end of the meeting that he felt a lot better about the situation now than he had several months previously, when he didn't have a clear picture as to the many activities carried on by the Agency. Senator Byrd had a specific question as to the number of clerks and stenographers in Washington, and the Director undertook to furnish this information.

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6. At the conclusion of the meeting, I handed Senator Russell a classified report which he had requested on his 1955 trip to the Soviet Union, prepared by [redacted] of this Agency.

7. On the way back from the meeting, the Director instructed me to inform those concerned that he wanted to expedite the completion of the functional breakdown of personnel so that he could brief the interested Congressmen and Senators at the earliest possible time.

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/s/ Norman S. Paul

Norman S. Paul

Legislative Counsel

IG/LC:NSPaul:fm (5 Feb. 57)

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